Ludwig David
Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, Netherlands.
Eur J Philos Sci. 2024;14(3):37. doi: 10.1007/s13194-024-00594-5. Epub 2024 Jul 27.
The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky's account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of "natural kind" and experiment with new philosophical frameworks.
自然种类的传统塑造了关于科学分类的哲学辩论，但也受到了越来越多的批评。为回应这种批评，雷东和埃雷舍夫斯基提出了他们基于功能的解释，作为更新和捍卫自然种类传统的一种策略。本文认为，基于功能确实为科学分类提供了一种富有成效的哲学方法，但作为一种自然种类的一般理论却难以令人信服。相反，雷东和埃雷舍夫斯基解释的优点和局限性说明了为什么是时候超越“自然种类”的一般定义，并尝试新的哲学框架了。
