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记忆和目标收益增强了进化社会困境中的合作。

Memory and target payoff enhance cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas.

机构信息

Jinan University-University of Birmingham Joint Institute, Jinan University, Guangzhou 511443, China.

PSBC Consumer Finance, Guangzhou 511458, China.

出版信息

Chaos. 2024 Aug 1;34(8). doi: 10.1063/5.0220490.

DOI:10.1063/5.0220490
PMID:39088347
Abstract

We proposed a neighbor selection mechanism based on memory and target payoff, where the target payoff is the maximum value of the group's average expected payoff. According to this mechanism, individuals prioritize selecting neighbors whose average payoffs in the last M rounds are close to the target payoff for strategy learning, aiming to maximize the group's expected payoff. Simulation results on the grid-based Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games demonstrate that this mechanism can significantly improve the group's payoff and cooperation level. Furthermore, the longer the memory length, the higher the group's payoff and cooperation level. Overall, the combination of memory and target payoff can lead to the emergence and persistence of cooperation in social dilemmas as individuals are motivated to cooperate based on both their past experiences and future goals. This interplay highlights the significance of taking into account numerous variables in comprehending and promoting cooperation within evolutionary frameworks.

摘要

我们提出了一种基于记忆和目标收益的邻居选择机制,其中目标收益是群体平均期望收益的最大值。根据该机制,个体优先选择在过去 M 轮中平均收益接近目标收益的邻居进行策略学习,以最大化群体的期望收益。基于网格的囚徒困境和雪堆博弈的仿真结果表明,该机制可以显著提高群体的收益和合作水平。此外,记忆长度越长,群体的收益和合作水平越高。总体而言,记忆和目标收益的结合可以导致社会困境中合作的出现和持续,因为个体基于过去的经验和未来的目标而受到合作的激励。这种相互作用强调了在理解和促进进化框架内的合作时考虑众多变量的重要性。

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