School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing), Beijing, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Aug 15;19(8):e0308932. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0308932. eCollection 2024.
Existing studies have explored the impact of venture capital shareholding on the GEM-listed companies before and after listing from multiple perspectives. However, there has been limited research on the influence of venture capital shareholding on these companies' mergers and acquisitions(M&A) activities and performance. Additionally, two conflicting research findings have been presented in limited relevant studies. In order to clarify the mechanism by which venture capital shareholding affects M&A activities and performance of GEM-listed companies and verify existing research conclusions, this paper takes 468 M&A events completed by the acquirer of China's GEM-listed companies between 2014 and 2016 as samples to explore venture capital shareholding's effects on the M&A performance of GEM-listed enterprises. The empirical findings demonstrate that GEM-listed enterprises with venture capital shareholding perform significantly better in terms of short-term and long-term M&A performance than those without; with the increase in venture capital shareholding ratio, the short-term M&A performance of GEM-listed enterprises has remarkably improved, but the long-term M&A performance does not show obvious correlation; joint investment of venture capital can significantly improve the short-term M&A performance of GEM-listed enterprises, but it has no substantial influence on long-term M&A performance. Based on further analysis of the empirical study, it is concluded that the common one-share ownership structure of GEM-listed enterprises is not conducive to the play of the monitoring function of venture capital, and the insufficient incentives and free-riding thinking also weaken the motivation and input of some venture capital shareholders to provide value-added services. This study systematically elucidates the mechanism and impact of venture capital shareholding on the M&A performance of GEM-listed companies, addressing the shortcomings in existing research. It is conducive for GEM-listed companies to gain a rational understanding and effectively leverage the active role of venture capital shareholders in M&A activities.
现有研究从多个角度探讨了风险投资持股对创业板上市公司上市前后的影响。然而,对于风险投资持股对这些公司的并购(M&A)活动和绩效的影响,研究相对较少。此外,在有限的相关研究中提出了两种相互矛盾的研究结果。为了厘清风险投资持股影响创业板上市公司并购活动和绩效的机制,验证现有研究结论,本文以 2014-2016 年我国创业板上市公司收购方完成的 468 起并购事件为样本,探讨风险投资持股对创业板企业并购绩效的影响。实证结果表明,具有风险投资持股的创业板上市公司在短期和长期并购绩效方面均显著优于没有风险投资持股的公司;随着风险投资持股比例的增加,创业板上市公司的短期并购绩效显著提高,但长期并购绩效没有明显的相关性;风险投资的联合投资可以显著提高创业板上市公司的短期并购绩效,但对长期并购绩效没有实质性影响。基于实证研究的进一步分析,得出创业板上市公司的一股独大的股权结构不利于风险投资发挥监督作用,激励不足和搭便车思维也削弱了部分风险投资股东提供增值服务的动机和投入。本研究系统地阐明了风险投资持股对创业板上市公司并购绩效的作用机制和影响,弥补了现有研究的不足。有助于创业板上市公司理性认识并有效利用风险投资股东在并购活动中的积极作用。