School of Business Administration, Faculty of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China.
Faculty of Business, City University of Macau, Macau, S.A.R. China.
PLoS One. 2024 Sep 20;19(9):e0307215. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0307215. eCollection 2024.
This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonparametric Ito stochastic method, the research addresses key challenges of information asymmetry and market uncertainty. The proposed methodology emphasizes dynamic pricing strategies and market adaptation, constructing a Nash equilibrium framework within railway freight pricing. The findings suggest significant strategic benefits for railway enterprises, positioning BRFO as a crucial tool for improving competitiveness in the face of alternative transport options.
本研究提出了一种新颖的回购铁路货运期权(BRFO),利用Stackelberg 博弈论增强铁路货运交易的战略管理。通过将传统的回购理论与多阶段三叉树定价模型相结合,并通过非参数 Ito 随机方法进行参数识别,研究解决了信息不对称和市场不确定性的关键挑战。所提出的方法强调动态定价策略和市场适应,在铁路货运定价中构建纳什均衡框架。研究结果表明,铁路企业具有显著的战略优势,BRFO 是面对替代运输方式提高竞争力的重要工具。