Wang Chao, Wang Feifei, Jiang Ping
School of Management, Hunan Institute of Engineering, Xiangtan, China.
School of Economics, Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, China.
Front Psychol. 2024 Sep 9;15:1430137. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430137. eCollection 2024.
With the increasingly prominent environmental issues in China, the government and citizens alike have intensified their focus on corporate investments in green environmental protection. Nevertheless, as government regulations become more stringent, there is substantial debate over whether environmental regulatory policies can consistently encourage listed companies to increase green environmental investments. Simultaneously, independent board supervision plays a crucial role in promoting the compliance and sustainability of listed companies regarding environmental protection. This paper selected a sample of 246 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2019, and used a fixed effects model to examine the impact of environmental regulation on the environmental investment of listed companies in China. Moreover, we used a mediation effect model to analyze the role of independent director supervision in influencing the relationship between environmental regulation and companies' green environmental investment. Additionally, we discuss the heterogeneous impact of environmental regulations on corporate environmental investments. Our findings are as follows: first, during the sample period, the tightening of environmental regulations significantly reduces the growth of environmental investment among the studied firms. As government environmental regulatory policies gradually intensify, the negative impact on environmental investments by listed companies becomes increasingly evident. Second, independent directors help alleviate the adverse impacts of environmental regulations on the environmental investment levels of listed companies. This suggests that the inclusion of independent directors in board governance plays a role in assessing government environmental regulatory policies and overseeing corporate decisions related to environmental investment. Lastly, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that environmental regulation significantly negatively impacts the environmental investment of listed companies in pollution-intensive industries and those located in the western regions. Furthermore, environmental regulatory policies impose greater constraints on the environmental investments of small-sized listed companies compared to their large-sized counterparts.
随着中国环境问题日益突出，政府和公民都加大了对企业绿色环保投资的关注。然而，随着政府监管变得更加严格，关于环境监管政策是否能持续鼓励上市公司增加绿色环保投资存在大量争议。同时，独立董事监督在促进上市公司在环境保护方面的合规性和可持续性方面发挥着关键作用。本文选取了2010年至2019年246家中国上市公司作为样本，使用固定效应模型研究环境监管对中国上市公司环境投资的影响。此外，我们使用中介效应模型分析独立董事监督在影响环境监管与公司绿色环保投资之间关系中的作用。此外，我们还讨论了环境监管对企业环境投资的异质性影响。我们的研究结果如下：第一，在样本期内，环境监管收紧显著降低了所研究公司的环境投资增长。随着政府环境监管政策逐渐强化，对上市公司环境投资的负面影响日益明显。第二，独立董事有助于减轻环境监管对上市公司环境投资水平的不利影响。这表明在董事会治理中纳入独立董事在评估政府环境监管政策和监督与环境投资相关的公司决策方面发挥了作用。最后，异质性分析表明，环境监管对污染密集型行业和位于西部地区的上市公司的环境投资有显著负面影响。此外，与大型上市公司相比，环境监管政策对小型上市公司的环境投资施加了更大的限制。
