Peninsula School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Plymouth, ITTC Building, Davy Road, Plymouth Science Park, Plymouth, UK.
Bayes Business School, Centre for Charity Effectiveness, Bayes Business School (Formerly Cass), London, UK.
Health Soc Care Deliv Res. 2024 Oct;12(39):1-180. doi: 10.3310/NTDT7965.
As a matter of policy, voluntary, community and social enterprises contribute substantially to the English health and care system. Few studies explain how the National Health Service and local authorities commission them, what outputs result, what contexts influence these outcomes and what differentiates this kind of commissioning.
To explain how voluntary, community and social enterprises are commissioned, the consequences, what barriers both parties face and what absorptive capacities they need.
Observational mixed-methods realist analysis: exploratory scoping, cross-sectional analysis of National Health Service Clinical Commissioning Group spending on voluntary, community and social enterprises, systematic comparison of case studies, action learning. Social prescribing, learning disability support and end-of-life care were tracers.
Maximum-variety sample of six English local health and care economies, 2019-23.
Commissioning staff; voluntary, community and social enterprise members.
None; observational study.
How the consequences of commissioning compared with the original aims of the commissioners and the voluntary, community and social enterprises: predominantly qualitative (non-measurable) outcomes.
Data sources were: 189 interviews, 58 policy and position papers, 37 items of rapportage, 692,659 Clinical Commissioning Group invoices, 102 Freedom of Information enquiries, 131 survey responses, 18 local project group meetings, 4 national action learning set meetings. Data collected in England during 2019-23.
Two modes of commissioning operated in parallel. Commodified commissioning relied on creating a principal-agent relationship between commissioner and the voluntary, community and social enterprises, on formal competitive selection ('procurement') of providers. Collaborative commissioning relied on 'embedded' interorganisational relationships, mutual recognition of resource dependencies, a negotiated division of labour between organisations, and control through persuasion. Commissioners and voluntary, community and social enterprises often worked around the procurement regulations. Both modes were present everywhere but the balance depended inter alia on the number and size of voluntary, community and social enterprises in each locality, their past commissioning experience, the character of the tracer activity, and the level of deprivation and the geographic dispersal of the populations served. The COVID-19 pandemic produced a shift towards collaborative commissioning. Voluntary, community and social enterprises were not always funded at the full cost of their activity. Integrated Care System formation temporarily disrupted local co-commissioning networks but offered a longer-term prospect of greater voluntary, community and social enterprise influence on co-commissioning. To develop absorptive capacity, commissioners needed stronger managerial and communication capabilities, and voluntary, community and social enterprises needed greater capability to evidence what outcomes their proposals would deliver.
Published data quality limited the spending profile accuracy, which did not include local authority commissioning. Case studies did not cover London, and focused on three tracer activities. Absorptive capacity survey was not a random sample.
The two modes of commissioning sometimes conflicted. Workarounds arose from organisations' embeddedness and collaboration, which the procurement regulations often disrupted. Commissioning activity at below its full cost appears unsustainable.
Spending profiles of local authority commissioning; analysis of commissioning in London and of activities besides the present tracers. Analysis of absorptive capacity and its consequences, adjusting the concept for application to voluntary, community and social enterprises. Comparison with other health systems' commissioning of voluntary, community and social enterprises.
This award was funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Health and Social Care Delivery Research programme (NIHR award ref: NIHR128107) and is published in full in Health and Social Care Delivery Research; Vol. 12, No. 39. See the NIHR Funding and Awards website for further award information.
作为一项政策,志愿、社区和社会企业为英国的医疗保健系统做出了重大贡献。很少有研究解释国家卫生服务局和地方当局如何委托它们,产生了哪些成果,哪些背景因素影响了这些成果,以及这种委托有何不同。
解释志愿、社区和社会企业是如何被委托的,以及产生的结果、双方面临的障碍以及它们需要的吸收能力。
观察性混合方法现实主义分析:探索性范围界定,对国家卫生服务临床委托小组对志愿、社区和社会企业的支出进行横断面分析,对案例研究进行系统比较,行动学习。社会处方、学习障碍支持和临终关怀是追踪器。
2019-23 年,英格兰最大种类的六个地方卫生和保健经济。
委托工作人员;志愿、社区和社会企业成员。
无;观察性研究。
与委托人和志愿、社区和社会企业最初目标相比,委托的结果如何:主要是定性(不可衡量)的结果。
数据来源有:189 次访谈、58 份政策和立场文件、37 份报告、692659 份临床委托小组发票、102 份信息自由查询、131 份调查回复、18 个地方项目组会议、4 个国家行动学习集会议。2019-23 年期间在英格兰收集的数据。
两种委托模式并行运作。商品化委托依赖于在委托人和志愿、社区和社会企业之间建立一种委托代理关系,通过正式的竞争性选择(“采购”)提供者。协作委托依赖于“嵌入式”的组织间关系、相互承认资源依赖性、组织之间协商分工,以及通过说服进行控制。委托人和志愿、社区和社会企业经常在采购法规之外运作。这两种模式都存在,但平衡取决于每个地方志愿、社区和社会企业的数量和规模、它们过去的委托经验、跟踪活动的性质,以及服务人群的贫困程度和地理分布。新冠肺炎疫情导致协作委托转向。志愿、社区和社会企业的活动费用并不总是全额支付。综合护理系统的形成暂时打乱了当地的共同委托网络,但为志愿、社区和社会企业对共同委托的更大影响提供了一个更长期的前景。为了发展吸收能力,委托方需要更强的管理和沟通能力,志愿、社区和社会企业需要更大的能力来证明其提案将带来什么结果。
已发表数据的质量限制了支出概况的准确性,其中不包括地方当局的委托。案例研究没有涵盖伦敦,并且集中在三个跟踪活动上。吸收能力调查不是随机样本。
两种委托模式有时会发生冲突。组织的嵌入式和协作产生了工作规避,而采购法规经常会破坏这种协作。以低于全成本的价格进行委托似乎是不可持续的。
地方当局委托的支出概况;对伦敦和目前跟踪者以外的活动的委托进行分析。分析委托的吸收能力及其后果,为志愿、社区和社会企业的应用调整概念。与其他卫生系统对志愿、社区和社会企业的委托进行比较。
该奖项由英国国家卫生研究院(NIHR)健康和社会保健交付研究计划(NIHR 奖号:NIHR128107)资助,并在健康和社会保健交付研究中全文发表;第 12 卷,第 39 期。请访问 NIHR 资助和奖项网站,了解更多奖项信息。