Medical ethics and physician motivations.

This paper provides an institutional economics framework for analyzing medical ethics. An ethical policy partitions the set of physician actions into (un)ethical subsets, with unethical actions then unavailable. Individual physicians' preferences over policies combined with a political process determine equilibrium constraints. I show that physicians' concern for colleagues' patients uniquely motivates their support for ethics which restrict behavior under strong assumptions. Without these assumptions, even identical physicians might ban actions they would otherwise select for reasons varying from protecting patients to differences in the costs of maintaining ethical policies. Interestingly, heightened altruism for colleagues' patients makes the former reasoning less credible. Novel applications for 'Provide Free Care to Physicians' and 'Duty to Treat in a Pandemic' demonstrate: (i) rising physician income can explain long-run weakening of both formal ethics in the United States; and (ii) the duty to treat can deteriorate as fewer physicians are required to improve pandemic outcomes.