Pelech Daria, Song Zirui
Health Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, USA.
Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
Health Serv Res. 2025 Apr;60(2):e14392. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.14392. Epub 2024 Oct 21.
To examine how private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans responded to slower growth in federal payments after the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
We used publicly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on MA plan subsidies ("benchmarks"), asking prices ("bids"), plan premiums, cost-sharing, and covered benefits. Data covered all counties with MA plans between 2006 through 2019.
We examined plan responses to changes in benchmark subsidies by comparing changes in bids, rebates, and other outcomes between counties experiencing larger changes in benchmarks and counties with smaller changes, pre- and post-ACA. We used longitudinal fixed effects regression models to assess heterogeneity in how plans adjusted premiums and benefits across more and less competitive markets.
Analyses included all counties with at least one MA plan available to individual beneficiaries. Plans targeting special populations were excluded.
Average plan benchmarks fell by $89 per month post-ACA, adjusted for inflation. Plans responded similarly to benchmark subsidy decreases and increases, increasing bids by 62 cents for every dollar increase in subsidies pre-ACA (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.56 to 0.67) and decreasing them by 57 cents for every dollar reduction in subsidies post-ACA (95% CI: 0.49-0.65). However, post-ACA, plans altered less salient benefits, such as cost-sharing, by about twice as much as they had pre-ACA. Premiums changed by similar amounts before and after the ACA (-$0.07, 95% CI: from -$0.09 to -$0.06). Plans in more competitive markets responded less to payment changes than plans did in less competitive markets, suggesting the former are operating closer to marginal costs. Finally, payments to plans declined far less than projected due in part to other changes in MA policy.
Plans used partial pass-through of benchmark subsidy decreases to shield beneficiaries from cuts and allocated benchmark decreases to benefits that were less salient to the average enrollee. These findings, combined with higher-than-projected payments post-ACA, may explain the continued growth in MA enrollment.
研究《平价医疗法案》(ACA)实施后,私营医疗保险优势(MA)计划如何应对联邦支付增长放缓的情况。
我们使用了医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心公开的关于MA计划补贴(“基准”)、投标价格(“出价”)、计划保费、费用分担和涵盖福利的数据。数据涵盖了2006年至2019年有MA计划的所有县。
我们通过比较ACA实施前后基准补贴变化较大的县和变化较小的县之间出价、回扣和其他结果的变化,研究了计划对基准补贴变化的反应。我们使用纵向固定效应回归模型来评估计划在竞争程度不同的市场中调整保费和福利方式的异质性。
分析包括所有至少有一个可供个人受益人的MA计划的县。针对特殊人群的计划被排除在外。
经通胀调整后,ACA实施后计划的平均基准每月下降89美元。计划对基准补贴减少和增加的反应相似,ACA实施前补贴每增加1美元,出价增加62美分(95%置信区间[CI]:0.56至0.67),ACA实施后补贴每减少1美元,出价减少57美分(95%CI:0.49 - 0.65)。然而,ACA实施后,计划对不太突出的福利(如费用分担)的调整幅度约为ACA实施前的两倍。ACA实施前后保费变化幅度相似(-0.07美元,95%CI:从-0.09美元至-0.06美元)。竞争更激烈市场中的计划对支付变化的反应比竞争不那么激烈市场中的计划小,这表明前者的运营更接近边际成本。最后,对计划的支付下降幅度远低于预期,部分原因是MA政策的其他变化。
计划部分转嫁基准补贴减少的影响,以保护受益人免受削减,并将基准减少分配给对普通参保人不太突出的福利。这些发现,再加上ACA实施后高于预期的支付,可能解释了MA参保人数的持续增长。