Accounting School, Nanfang College Guangzhou, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Oct 24;19(10):e0312247. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0312247. eCollection 2024.
This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation schemes and ESG greenwashing behavior in Chinese listed firms during the period 2013-2022. We find that a CEO's cash (equity) compensation has a significantly positive (negative) correlation with corporate ESG greenwashing behavior. From mechanism analysis, consistent with the agency problem view, firms engage in more severe ESG greenwashing behavior under a higher proportion of cash in the CEO compensation structure. Such distortion behavior is mitigated by higher internal control quality in firms having an equity incentive for their CEO under the convergence of interest viewpoint. Additional analysis reveals that corporates audited by large accounting firms and those with more media coverage exacerbate the positive correlation between CEO cash compensation and ESG greenwashing behavior, while government environmental regulations reinforce the inhibitory effect of CEO equity compensation on ESG greenwashing. Our results imply that different CEO compensation schemes can have opposite effects on limiting firms' ESG greenwashing behavior in the Chinese context. Furthermore, we highlight that the question of form over substance principle to certain external governance mechanisms, leading CEO to exacerbate impression management of ESG disclosure.
本研究考察了 2013-2022 年间中国上市公司首席执行官薪酬方案与 ESG 漂绿行为之间的关系。我们发现，首席执行官的现金（股权）薪酬与公司的 ESG 漂绿行为呈显著正（负）相关。从机制分析来看，与代理问题观点一致，在首席执行官薪酬结构中现金占比越高，企业越倾向于进行更严重的 ESG 漂绿行为。在利益趋同观点下，对于实施了首席执行官股权激励的企业，较高的内部控制质量可以减轻这种扭曲行为。进一步的分析表明，由大型会计师事务所审计的企业和受到媒体更多关注的企业会加剧首席执行官现金薪酬与 ESG 漂绿行为之间的正相关关系，而政府环境法规则强化了首席执行官股权薪酬对 ESG 漂绿行为的抑制作用。我们的研究结果表明，不同的首席执行官薪酬方案可能会对中国企业的 ESG 漂绿行为产生相反的限制作用。此外，我们还强调了形式重于实质原则对某些外部治理机制的影响，这可能导致首席执行官加剧 ESG 披露的印象管理。
