Gao Liyan, Pan Qiuhui, He Mingfeng
School of Mathematical Science, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China.
School of Physics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China.
Chaos. 2025 Feb 1;35(2). doi: 10.1063/5.0256927.
When the number of cooperators does not reach the collective target, resulting in the collective risk social dilemma, the self-organizing behavior of the group leads to the loss of collective interest and the government intervention leads to the increase of collective interest. For these two situations, we study the evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game in well-mixed population. The results show that the introduction of the threshold makes it possible to generate complex dynamics with two interior equilibria in the replication equation. For self-organizing behavior, increasing the threshold is a double-edged sword. Although raising the threshold may increase the level of cooperation, the risk of dominance of defection also increases. For government intervention behavior, increasing the threshold significantly promotes cooperation. The common result is that individuals tend to free-ride when the group size increases. In addition, the greater the impact of the two behaviors on collective interest, the more conducive to promoting cooperation. When there are fewer initial cooperators, the government should intervene in time to generate cooperation. When there are more initial cooperators, self-organizing behavior is more conducive to attracting cooperators than government intervention. We hope that the model and results proposed in this paper can contribute to addressing the challenges posed by global issues such as climate change and the degradation of the ecological environment.
当合作者数量未达到集体目标，从而导致集体风险社会困境时，群体的自组织行为会导致集体利益受损，而政府干预则会使集体利益增加。针对这两种情况，我们研究了在完全混合群体中阈值公共品博弈下合作的演化。结果表明，阈值的引入使得复制方程中出现两个内部均衡的复杂动态成为可能。对于自组织行为而言，提高阈值是一把双刃剑。虽然提高阈值可能会提高合作水平，但背叛占主导的风险也会增加。对于政府干预行为，提高阈值能显著促进合作。共同的结果是，当群体规模增大时，个体倾向于搭便车。此外，这两种行为对集体利益的影响越大，就越有利于促进合作。当初始合作者较少时，政府应及时干预以产生合作。当初始合作者较多时，自组织行为比政府干预更有利于吸引合作者。我们希望本文提出的模型和结果能够有助于应对气候变化和生态环境退化等全球性问题所带来的挑战。
