Fields Chris, Albarracin Mahault, Friston Karl, Kiefer Alex, Ramstead Maxwell J D, Safron Adam
Allen Discovery Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA, United States.
VERSES, Los Angeles, CA, United States.
Neurosci Conscious. 2025 Apr 22;2025(1):niaf009. doi: 10.1093/nc/niaf009. eCollection 2025.
This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact directly with the external environment. In particular, we discuss the role of internal boundaries that have the structure of Markov blankets, and hence function as classical information channels between components. We then show how this formal structure supports models of attentional control and imaginative experience, with a focus on (i) how imaginative experience can employ the spatio-temporal and object-recognition reference frames employed in ordinary, non-imaginative experience and (ii) how imaginative experience can be internally generated but still surprising. We conclude by discussing the implementation, phenomenology, and phylogeny of imaginative experience, and the implications of the large state and trait variability of imaginative experience in humans.
本文探讨了自由能原理（FEP）对可能的意识模型所施加的限制，特别是注意力控制和想象体验的模型，包括情景记忆和规划。我们首先回顾自由能原理的经典和量子表述，重点关注它们在多组件系统中的应用，在这类系统中只有一些组件直接与外部环境相互作用。特别是，我们讨论了具有马尔可夫毯结构的内部边界的作用，因此其作为组件之间的经典信息通道发挥作用。然后我们展示这种形式结构如何支持注意力控制和想象体验的模型，重点关注：（i）想象体验如何利用普通非想象体验中使用的时空和物体识别参考框架，以及（ii）想象体验如何在内部产生但仍然令人惊讶。我们通过讨论想象体验的实现、现象学和系统发生，以及人类想象体验的巨大状态和特质变异性的影响来得出结论。
