Ashraf Nava, Bandiera Oriana, Davenport Edward, Lee Scott S
Department of Economics, LSE.
Department of Economics, LSE, and STICERD.
Am Econ Rev. 2020 May;110(5):1355-1394. doi: 10.1257/aer.20180326.
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.
我们在赞比亚一项针对新医疗保健职位的全国性招聘活动中开展了一项实地实验，以测试职业福利是否会以牺牲亲社会动机为代价来吸引人才。与普遍看法一致，提供职业机会吸引的亲社会申请者较少。然而，这种权衡仅存在于低水平人才中；接受干预的边际申请者更有才华且同样具有亲社会精神。这些人被录用，并在因果链的每一步都表现得更好：他们提供更多投入，提高设施利用率，并改善健康结果，包括儿童营养不良率降低25%。
