Alvarez Julio, Bortolami Alessio, Ducatez Mariette, Guinat Claire, Stegeman Jan Arend, Broglia Alessandro, Jensen Helene, Kryemadhi Kamela, Gervelmeyer Andrea
EFSA J. 2025 Jul 3;23(7):e9508. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2025.9508. eCollection 2025 Jul.
The emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1), clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype B3.13 in U.S. dairy cattle marks a significant shift in the virus' host range and epidemiological profile. Infected cattle typically exhibit mild clinical signs, such as reduced milk production, mastitis and fever, with morbidity generally below 20% and mortality averaging 2%. Transmission within farms is primarily driven by contaminated milk and milking procedures, while farm-to-farm spread is mainly linked to cattle movement and shared equipment. The virus demonstrates high replication in mammary glands, with infected cows shedding large quantities of virus in milk for up to 3 weeks, even in the absence of clinical signs. Shedding through other routes appears limited. Infected cattle develop virus-specific antibodies within 7-10 days, offering short-term protection, though the duration and robustness of immunity remain unclear. Between March 2024 and May 2025, the virus was confirmed in 981 dairy herds across 16 U.S. states, with California particularly affected. Risk factors identified for between-farm spread include cattle movement, shared equipment and contact with external personnel, while biosecurity measures, including waste management and wildlife deterrence, may reduce the risk of virus introduction. In response to the outbreaks, U.S. authorities implemented strict movement controls, mandatory testing and enhanced biosecurity protocols. Potential pathways of introduction of HPAI B3.13 virus into EU via trade from US could be the import of lactating cows and bovine meat, although strict trade regulations, absence of animal import and limited virus detection in meat, especially in muscle tissue, do not support this occurrence. Import of products containing raw milk could also be potential pathways for virus introduction. Migratory birds - particularly waterfowl - pose potential pathways for introduction during seasonal migrations. The detection of mammalian-adaptive mutations and zoonotic cases underscores the virus' public health relevance and the need for research, surveillance and cross-sectoral preparedness.
美国奶牛中出现高致病性禽流感(HPAI)A(H5N1)2.3.4.4b分支、B3.13基因型,标志着该病毒的宿主范围和流行病学特征发生了重大转变。受感染的牛通常表现出轻微的临床症状,如产奶量减少、乳腺炎和发热,发病率一般低于20%,死亡率平均为2%。农场内的传播主要由受污染的牛奶和挤奶程序驱动,而农场间的传播主要与牛的移动和共享设备有关。该病毒在乳腺中具有高复制能力,受感染的奶牛即使在没有临床症状的情况下,也会在长达3周的时间里在牛奶中大量排出病毒。通过其他途径的排毒似乎有限。受感染的牛在7至10天内产生病毒特异性抗体,提供短期保护,尽管免疫力的持续时间和强度仍不清楚。在2024年3月至2025年5月期间,美国16个州的981个奶牛群中确诊了该病毒,加利福尼亚州受影响尤为严重。确定的农场间传播风险因素包括牛的移动、共享设备以及与外部人员的接触,而包括废物管理和野生动物威慑在内的生物安全措施可能会降低病毒引入的风险。为应对疫情,美国当局实施了严格的移动控制、强制检测并加强了生物安全协议。HPAI B3.13病毒通过从美国的贸易进入欧盟的潜在途径可能是进口泌乳奶牛和牛肉,尽管严格的贸易法规、没有动物进口以及在肉类中尤其是肌肉组织中有限的病毒检测不支持这种情况发生。进口含有生牛奶的产品也可能是病毒引入的潜在途径。候鸟——尤其是水禽——在季节性迁徙期间构成了潜在的引入途径。哺乳动物适应性突变和人畜共患病病例的检测凸显了该病毒对公共卫生的相关性以及开展研究、监测和跨部门防范的必要性。