Kirkman-Liff B L, Christianson J B, Hillman D G
Health Serv Res. 1985 Dec;20(5):549-77.
This article develops a model of behavior in bidding for indigent medical care contracts in which bidders set bid prices to maximize their expected utility, conditional on estimates of variables which affect the payoff associated with winning or losing a contract. The hypotheses generated by this model are tested empirically using data from the first round of bidding in the Arizona indigent health care experiment. The behavior of bidding organizations in Arizona is found to be consistent in most respects with the predictions of the model. Bid prices appear to have been influenced by estimated costs and by expectations concerning the potential loss from not securing a contract, the initial wealth of the bidding organization, and the expected number of competitors in the bidding process.
本文建立了一个贫困医疗护理合同投标行为模型，在该模型中，投标人根据对影响赢得或失去合同相关收益的变量的估计来设定投标价格，以实现其预期效用最大化。利用亚利桑那州贫困医疗保健实验第一轮投标的数据，对该模型产生的假设进行了实证检验。结果发现，亚利桑那州投标机构的行为在大多数方面与模型预测一致。投标价格似乎受到估计成本、对未获得合同可能损失的预期、投标机构的初始财富以及投标过程中预期竞争对手数量的影响。
