Dittman D A, Morey R C
Health Serv Res. 1983 Summer;18(2 Pt 1):137-64.
This paper applies and extends the use of a nonlinear hospital pricing model, recently posited in the literature by Dittman and Morey [1]. That model applied a hospital profit-maximizing behavior and studied the effects of optimal pricing of hospital ancillary services on the incidence of payment by private insurance companies and the Medicare trust fund. Here, we examine variations of the above model where both hospital profit-maximizing and profit-satisficing postures are of interest. We apply the model to three types of Medicare reimbursement policies currently in use or under legislative mandate to implement. The policies differ according to hospital size and whether cross-subsidies are allowed. We are interested in determining the effects of profit-maximizing and -satisficing behaviors of these three reimbursement policies on the levels of profits received, and on the respective implications for private payors and the Medicare trust fund.
本文应用并扩展了一种非线性医院定价模型的使用，该模型最近由迪特曼和莫雷[1]在文献中提出。该模型应用了医院利润最大化行为，并研究了医院辅助服务的最优定价对私人保险公司支付发生率和医疗保险信托基金的影响。在这里，我们研究上述模型的变体，其中医院利润最大化和利润满意姿态都令人感兴趣。我们将该模型应用于目前正在使用或根据立法授权实施的三种医疗保险报销政策。这些政策根据医院规模以及是否允许交叉补贴而有所不同。我们有兴趣确定这三种报销政策的利润最大化和利润满意行为对所获利润水平的影响，以及对私人付款人和医疗保险信托基金的各自影响。
