Rutberg A T
J Theor Biol. 1983 Sep 7;104(1):93-112. doi: 10.1016/0022-5193(83)90403-4.
The evolution of primate monogamy is described as an ordered sequence of choices by generalized, hypothetical females and males. Females first choose whether or not to associate with other females. Predators encourage gregariousness in diurnal primates; however, nocturnality or scarce and evenly distributed food supplies may enforce separation. A testable group size model based on food patch size is developed and qualitatively supported. If females choose solitude, males then choose either to defend a single female and invest in her offspring, or to compete with other males for access to several females, usually by defending a territory or establishing dominance over the home ranges of several females. The decision rests on the defensibility of females and on the availability of an effective form of male parental investment. Both of these factors are dependent on local female population density. A model is developed that assumes that territorial defense is the principal form of male parental investment, and it predicts that monogamy should occur at intermediate densities: at high densities, males should switch to defense of multiple females, and at low densities there is no investment value in male territorial defense. The model is shown to be only partly adequate. Variation in local population densities prevents the establishment of obligate monogamy through territoriality in small monkeys, since male territorial behavior is inconsistent over the long run. Here, carrying of offspring by males can succeed territoriality, providing an effective and reliable form of parental investment to maintain the pair bond in the face of population fluctuations and changes in group structures. This hypothesis is supported by the scarcity of obligate monogamy among the prosimians, which frequently do not carry their young.
灵长类动物一夫一妻制的进化被描述为广义的、假设的雌性和雄性按顺序做出的一系列选择。雌性首先选择是否与其他雌性交往。捕食者促使昼行性灵长类动物群居;然而,夜行性或食物供应稀缺且分布均匀的情况可能导致分离。基于食物斑块大小建立了一个可检验的群体规模模型,并得到了定性支持。如果雌性选择独居,雄性则选择要么保卫一只雌性并为其后代投入,要么与其他雄性竞争以接近几只雌性,通常是通过保卫一片领地或在几只雌性的活动范围内确立主导地位。这个决定取决于雌性的可保卫性以及雄性亲代投资的有效形式的可获得性。这两个因素都取决于当地雌性种群密度。建立了一个模型,该模型假设领地保卫是雄性亲代投资的主要形式,并预测一夫一妻制应出现在中等密度时:在高密度时,雄性应转向保卫多只雌性,而在低密度时雄性领地保卫没有投资价值。该模型显示仅部分适用。当地种群密度的变化阻碍了小型猴子通过领地行为建立严格的一夫一妻制,因为从长远来看雄性的领地行为并不一致。在这里,雄性携带后代可以取代领地行为,提供一种有效且可靠的亲代投资形式,以在种群波动和群体结构变化的情况下维持配偶关系。这一假设得到了原猴亚目动物中严格一夫一妻制稀缺的支持,原猴亚目动物通常不携带幼崽。