Wennberg J E
N Engl J Med. 1982 Nov 25;307(22):1374-81. doi: 10.1056/NEJM198211253072204.
Local hospital markets have been shown to vary extensively in per capita expenditures for hospital services and in the reimbursements paid per Medicare enrollee and per Blue Cross subscriber. Insurance premiums do not reflect these differences among local markets, resulting in intermarket subsidies (transfer payments) and distortion of competition between health-maintenance organizations and the fee-for-service system. Regulatory strategies to "cap" hospital costs have ignored these market variations and thus perpetuated the established pattern of expenditures and transfer payments. The plans for implementing a voucher system for the Medicare program set the value of the voucher according to average reimbursements at the county or state level. Since several markets can exist within one county's boundaries, the cash value established for the voucher in some low-cost markets will substantially exceed current per capita rates of reimbursement, permitting large profits and an increase in total costs to the Medicare program. If the price of health insurance were adjusted to correspond more closely to local market conditions, transfer payments would be reduced, and more effective regulation, competition, and consumer involvement might result.
当地医院市场在人均医院服务支出以及医疗保险参保者和蓝十字保险订阅者的人均报销金额方面存在很大差异。保险费并未反映当地市场之间的这些差异,从而导致了市场间补贴(转移支付)以及健康维护组织与按服务收费系统之间竞争的扭曲。“限制”医院成本的监管策略忽略了这些市场差异,因此延续了既定的支出模式和转移支付。为医疗保险计划实施代金券制度的计划是根据县或州一级的平均报销金额来设定代金券的价值。由于一个县的范围内可能存在多个市场,在一些低成本市场为代金券确定的现金价值将大大超过当前的人均报销率,从而产生巨额利润,并导致医疗保险计划的总成本增加。如果调整医疗保险价格使其更紧密地符合当地市场状况,转移支付将会减少,可能会带来更有效的监管、竞争以及消费者参与。