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作为追求销售最大化的实体的医院。

The hospital as a sales-maximizing entity.

作者信息

Finkler S A

出版信息

Health Serv Res. 1983 Summer;18(2 Pt 1):117-36.

PMID:6874355
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1068739/
Abstract

This paper extends the Baumol sales-maximization theory to the not-for-profit hospital industry. Hospital demand is modeled as a function of both price and the number of physicians affiliated with a hospital. The latter variable results in interdependency of demand among the products offered by a hospital. The broader the product scope, the greater the number of affiliated physicians, and, therefore, the greater the demand for each of the hospital's products. Hospital competition is focused on the physician rather than the consumer (patient), as hospitals vie to maintain their market share.

摘要

本文将鲍莫尔销售最大化理论扩展至非营利性医院行业。医院需求被建模为价格和与医院附属的医生数量的函数。后一个变量导致医院提供的产品之间需求的相互依存性。产品范围越广,附属医生数量就越多,因此,医院每种产品的需求就越大。由于医院竞相维持其市场份额,医院竞争的焦点在于医生而非消费者(患者)。