• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

Antitrust implications of chiropractic Peer Review Committees.

作者信息

Volper V

出版信息

Am J Law Med. 1982 Spring;8(1):45-68.

PMID:7124747
Abstract

Peer Review Committees (PRCs) that aid insurance companies in evaluating chiropractic treatments and fees have been the focus of recent court challenges. Some practitioners have argued that PRC activities constitute price fixing in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. PRCs have been successful thus far in claiming an exemption from antitrust scrutiny as a "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This Note contends that PRCs are not exempt from antitrust regulation; since PRCs do not spread risks and are involved in inter- rather than intra-industry agreements, their activities do not fall within the narrowly defined "business of insurance" exemption. The Note then analyzes the merits of the price fixing allegations under both the "per se" standard and the " rule of reason." First, the Note concludes that the unique nature of the health care market and the legitimate functions served by peer review make the application of a per se standard inappropriate. Second, under the rule of reason, the Note indicates that peer review encourages efficient and innovative health care practices while it deters the escalation of health care costs. The Note concludes that the net effect of peer review is not anticompetitive, especially since PRCs lack the coercive power to compel compliance with the recommendations.

摘要

相似文献

1
Antitrust implications of chiropractic Peer Review Committees.
Am J Law Med. 1982 Spring;8(1):45-68.
2
Health Maintenance Organizations and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Am J Law Med. 1982 Winter;7(4):437-67.
3
Group life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.: the McCarran-Ferguson Act and Health Service Plans.团体人寿与健康保险公司诉皇家药品公司案:《麦卡伦-弗格森法案》与健康服务计划
Am J Law Med. 1980 Winter;5(4):393-413.
4
Supreme court rules that an agreement between insurer and a peer review organization is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.最高法院裁定,保险公司与同行评审组织之间的协议不免于反垄断审查。
Health Law Vigil. 1982 Jul 23;5(15):4-5.
5
Antitrust and third party insurers.反垄断与第三方保险公司。
Am J Law Med. 1982 Fall;8(3):251-70.
6
Most-favored-nation clauses and monopsonistic power: an unhealthy mix?最惠国条款与买方垄断势力:有害组合?
Am J Law Med. 1989;15(1):111-28.
7
Antitrust and health care: provider controlled health plans and the Maricopa decision.反垄断与医疗保健:医疗服务提供者控制的健康保险计划及马里科帕判决
Am J Law Med. 1982 Fall;8(3):223-49.
8
Peer review of fees by physician groups: antitrust issues.
Health Law Vigil. 1986 Jul 18;9(14):5-8.
9
Recent supreme court antitrust rulings in health care.美国最高法院近期关于医疗保健领域的反垄断裁决。
Am J Hosp Pharm. 1983 Apr;40(4):639-41.
10
Minimizing antitrust and corporate liability risks.将反垄断和企业责任风险降至最低。
Health Prog. 1987 Apr;68(3):68-73, 90.