Ehrlich I
Br J Soc Psychol. 1982 Jun;21 Pt 2:107-20. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1982.tb00520.x.
The general proposition developed in this paper is that the frequency of offences of specific types is determined, by and large, not as the capricious outcome of biological or social idiosyncracies, but as the result of the equilibrating interplay of systematic 'supply and demand' forces. The role of public intervention via police, courts, correctional institutions, and economic policy in general, is then viewed in terms of its impact on the equilibrium level of activity in illegitimate markets, rather than in terms of its effect on either the supply or the demand sides of these markets separately. From a policy perspective the implication is that the efficacy of public intervention in the 'business of crime' must be assessed through the relevant comparative statics or dynamics of market equilibrium, rather than by reference to partial settings. For example, one would seek to know not just whether a rehabilitative project can enhance the likelihood that a group of known offenders will be successfully absorbed in legitimate or socially desirable pursuits, but whether the rehabilitative project, even if successful, would lead to a corresponding reduction in the overall volume of crime. Recognition of the existence and role of the 'market for offences' is shown to lead to important modifications in previous economic analyses of illegitimate activities concerning not only the efficacy of rehabilitation and other means of direct control of individual offenders, but of means of general deterrence as well. The paper states conditions under which individual control is efficacious and shows that it will be ineffective precisely whereas general deterrence is effective. Generally, the relatively efficacy of all means of public enforcement of laws is shown to be a function of both supply and demand elasticities rather than a function of supply elasticities alone. The analysis includes a brief discussion of what is meant by the supply and demand notions is crime, and, indeed, by the more provocative concept of the 'market for offences'.
本文提出的总体观点是，特定类型犯罪的发生率大体上并非由生物或社会特质的随意结果所决定，而是系统性“供求”力量平衡相互作用的结果。那么，通过警察、法院、惩教机构以及一般经济政策进行的公共干预的作用，应从其对非法市场活动均衡水平的影响来考量，而非分别从其对这些市场供求双方的影响来考量。从政策角度看，这意味着对“犯罪业务”中公共干预效果的评估必须通过市场均衡的相关比较静态分析或动态分析，而非参考局部情况。例如，人们不仅要了解一个改造项目是否能提高一群已知罪犯成功融入合法或社会期望追求的可能性，还要了解该改造项目即使成功，是否会导致犯罪总量相应减少。对“犯罪市场”的存在及其作用的认识表明，这会对以往关于非法活动的经济分析产生重要修正，不仅涉及改造及其他直接控制个体罪犯手段的效果，还涉及一般威慑手段的效果。本文阐述了个体控制有效的条件，并表明在一般威慑有效时个体控制恰恰无效。总体而言，法律公共执行所有手段的相对效果表明是供求弹性的函数，而非仅为供给弹性的函数。该分析简要讨论了犯罪中供求概念的含义，以及实际上“犯罪市场”这一更具争议性概念的含义。
