Loustau R J
Acta Psiquiatr Psicol Am Lat. 1975 Sep-Dec;31(3-4):199-206.
The author discusses Freudian dualistic conception of drives and contends that it can be reduced to a monistic one, on the basis of modern conceptions of Biology, and after scanning the original writings of Freud on the subject of drive and instinct. The word Trieb (drive) is used by Freud as compared with Instinkt (instinct); in 1915 the concept is defined through its attributes: thrust, source, objet and goal; being object and goal contingent for the drive and fixed for instincts. The first dualism is love vs. hunger; the drives are either sexual or autoconservative. But Biology demonstrates today that all life movements are autoconservative. The second dualism, love vs. hate, and the third one, Eros vs. Thantos, interpreted through Biology, show that there is always a prevailing therm, the first one. In this view, instinct should be but one successful drive, "frozen" through time because of its very success, and transmitted through philogenetic channels, in order to be enlivened in each ontogenetic process.
作者探讨了弗洛伊德关于驱力的二元论概念,并主张基于现代生物学概念,在研读了弗洛伊德关于驱力和本能主题的原始著作后,该概念可简化为一元论。与本能(Instinkt)相比,弗洛伊德使用了“Trieb”(驱力)一词;1915年,该概念通过其属性来定义:驱力、来源、对象和目标;驱力的对象和目标是偶然的,而本能的对象和目标是固定的。第一种二元论是爱与饥饿;驱力要么是性驱力,要么是自我保存驱力。但如今生物学表明,所有生命活动都是自我保存的。第二种二元论,爱与恨,以及第三种二元论,爱神与死神,从生物学角度解读表明,总是存在一种占主导地位的驱力,即第一种。按照这种观点,本能应该只是一种成功的驱力,由于其自身的成功而随时间“固化下来”,并通过种系发生渠道传递,以便在每个个体发生过程中被激活。