Hesslow G
Department of Physiology and Biophysics, University of Lund, Sweden.
J Theor Biol. 1994 Nov 7;171(1):29-39. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.1994.1209.
This paper is a defence of a pragmatic version of mind-brain reductionism from a neuroscientist's point of view. It is claimed that there are good reasons to believe that future neuroscience will be able to explain (in a weak and pragmatic sense) the puzzling aspects of mind and consciousness. Opposition to reductionism comes from both philosophical and empirical quarters. It is argued here that philosophical arguments, such as semantic problems with the concept of identity, are unconvincing and should be regarded with the greatest suspicion. The most influential empirical result that has been claimed to constitute a problem for reductionism is the temporal delay and mental antedating of consciousness found by Benjamin Libet. It is argued that these results, far from being a problem for reductionism, constitute evidence for a particular view of the physiological origins of consciousness. Finally, it is argued that many subjective aspects of experience can already be given satisfactory scientific explanations and that scientific progress is likely to rob the mind and subjective experience of their mystery.
本文从神经科学家的视角为一种实用主义版本的心灵-大脑还原论进行辩护。有人认为，有充分理由相信未来的神经科学将能够（从一种弱的、实用主义的意义上）解释心灵和意识中令人困惑的方面。对还原论的反对来自哲学和实证两个领域。这里认为，诸如同一性概念的语义问题等哲学论证是没有说服力的，应当受到最大程度的怀疑。据称，最有影响力的、被认为给还原论构成问题的实证结果是本杰明·利贝特发现的意识的时间延迟和心理前置。这里认为，这些结果远非还原论的问题，而是构成了关于意识生理起源的一种特定观点的证据。最后，有人认为，经验的许多主观方面已经能够得到令人满意的科学解释，而且科学进步很可能消除心灵和主观经验的神秘性。
