Fodor J
Graduate Center, CUNY, NY 10036.
Cognition. 1994 Apr-Jun;50(1-3):95-113. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90023-x.
An informal, but revisionist, discussion of the role that the concept of a concept plays in recent theories of the cognitive mind. It is argued that the practically universal assumption that concepts are (at least partially) individuated by their roles in inferences is probably mistaken. A revival of conceptual atomism appears to be the indicated alternative.
对“概念”这一概念在近期认知心智理论中所起作用的一种非正式但具有修正主义色彩的讨论。有人认为,那种认为概念(至少部分地)由其在推理中的作用来个体化的几乎普遍的假设可能是错误的。概念原子论的复兴似乎是一种可行的替代方案。