Heriot M J
Department of Anthropology, Santa Clara University, USA.
Med Anthropol Q. 1996 Jun;10(2):176-94. doi: 10.1525/maq.1996.10.2.02a00050.
This article examines the debates surrounding the personhood of the fetus in relationship to the mother as these issues were socially constructed in the Mississippi state legislature in 1990 and 1991. In examining the patriarchal assumptions that underlay the proposed Mississippi legislation, the article also addresses the legal ramifications of defining the fetus as a person whose rights are posited as equal to, or greater than, those of the pregnant woman. By relying on medical/scientific definitions of personhood, the groundwork for further refinement and monitoring of women and fetuses is being established, such that what it means to be human is increasingly defined in essentialist terms. In the final evaluation, focusing on conception as the moment in which an "unborn child" is created sets the stage for the ultimate essentialist metaphor: a eugenic definition of personhood.
本文探讨了1990年和1991年在密西西比州立法机构中,围绕胎儿相对于母亲的人格地位所展开的辩论,这些问题是在社会层面构建起来的。在审视构成密西西比州所提议立法基础的父权制假设时,本文还论述了将胎儿定义为一个其权利被设定为等同于或大于孕妇权利之人的法律后果。通过依赖人格的医学/科学定义,正在为进一步细化和监控妇女与胎儿奠定基础,以至于对何为人类的界定越来越多地依据本质主义的术语。在最终的评估中,将受孕视为“未出生婴儿”形成的时刻,为终极的本质主义隐喻奠定了基础:一种优生学的人格定义。