Gilbert R J, Shapiro C
Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley 94720, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1996 Nov 12;93(23):12749-55. doi: 10.1073/pnas.93.23.12749.
The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called "essential facilities doctrine," which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an "essential facility" to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.
美国的知识产权法赋予知识产权所有者自行决定许可他人使用该知识产权的权利，或者制造、销售体现该知识产权的产品的权利。然而，反垄断法限制了具有市场支配力的企业对包括知识产权在内的财产的使用，并可能对知识产权许可加以限制。本文聚焦于反垄断法的一个方面，即所谓的“必要设施原则”，该原则可能会要求控制“必要设施”的企业向其竞争对手提供该设施。在知识产权背景下，提供财产的义务等同于强制许可的要求。强制许可可能包括要求软件所有者允许他人访问底层代码，以便其他人能够开发兼容的应用程序。强制许可可能会通过降低创新对发明者的价值来削弱研发激励。本文表明，强制许可在短期内还可能会因便利低效生产者进入市场以及促成导致价格上涨的许可安排而降低经济效率。
