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医院准入特权的经济回报。

The economic returns to hospital admitting privileges.

作者信息

Rizzo J A, Goddeeris J H

机构信息

Yale University, USA.

出版信息

J Health Polit Policy Law. 1998 Jun;23(3):483-515. doi: 10.1215/03616878-23-3-483.

DOI:10.1215/03616878-23-3-483
PMID:9626642
Abstract

Legal suits contesting the denial or termination of hospital staff privileges are the most common antitrust cases involving medical markets. There is, however, very little evidence about the economic implications for the physicians of having staff privileges. Using a nationally representative sample of self-employed physicians from 1992, this article presents estimates of the effects of hospital admitting privileges on physician earnings. The results indicate that for nonprimary care specialists with few admitting privileges, gaining an additional privilege increase earnings. This effect diminishes as the number of admitting privileges increases, however, and there are no economic gains beyond having three to four admitting privileges. Among primary care physicians, we detect no statistically significant effect of hospital admitting privileges on earnings. With the growing emphasis on managed care, physicians are being scrutinized both in terms of the quality of care they deliver and their impact on the economic performance of hospitals and managed care organizations. This suggests that the frequency of lawsuits involving the denial or rescission of medical staff privileges may assume even greater importance.

摘要

质疑医院员工特权被拒绝或终止的法律诉讼是涉及医疗市场的最常见反垄断案件。然而,关于拥有员工特权对医生的经济影响,几乎没有证据。本文利用1992年具有全国代表性的个体执业医生样本,给出了医院收治特权对医生收入影响的估计。结果表明,对于收治特权较少的非初级保健专科医生来说,额外获得一项特权会增加收入。然而,随着收治特权数量的增加,这种影响会减弱,拥有三到四项收治特权之后就没有经济收益了。在初级保健医生中,我们没有发现医院收治特权对收入有统计学上的显著影响。随着对管理式医疗的日益重视,医生在其所提供医疗服务的质量以及他们对医院和管理式医疗组织经济绩效的影响方面都受到了审视。这表明,涉及拒绝或撤销医务人员特权的诉讼频率可能会变得更加重要。

相似文献

1
The economic returns to hospital admitting privileges.医院准入特权的经济回报。
J Health Polit Policy Law. 1998 Jun;23(3):483-515. doi: 10.1215/03616878-23-3-483.
2
Restraint of trade implications for nurse practitioners: denial of hospital admitting or staff privileges.对执业护士的贸易限制影响:拒绝医院准入或员工特权。
J Am Acad Nurse Pract. 1993 Jul-Aug;5(4):175-8. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-7599.1993.tb00866.x.
3
Medical staff privileges: is antitrust a real issue for providers?
Healthc Financ Manage. 1986 Mar;40(3):64-70.
4
Medical staff privileges and the antitrust laws: a view from the Federal Trade Commission.医务人员特权与反垄断法:联邦贸易委员会的观点
Med Staff Couns. 1992 Spring;6(2):17-24.
5
Legal approaches to the restraint of trade of nurse practitioners: disparate reimbursement patterns.限制执业护士贸易的法律途径:不同的报销模式。
J Am Acad Nurse Pract. 1994 Feb;6(2):55-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-7599.1994.tb00918.x.
6
The physician cartel--potential hospital federal antitrust liability in class-based denial of staff privileges to clinical psychologists.医生卡特尔——基于类别拒绝临床心理学家享有员工特权时医院可能面临的联邦反垄断责任
Spec Law Dig Health Care Law. 1991 Jul(149):7-33.
7
Economic credentialing moves from the hospital to managed care.经济资格认证从医院转向管理式医疗。
J Health Care Finance. 1995 Fall;22(1):60-71.
8
What if your hospital corners the medical market?要是你的医院垄断了医疗市场会怎么样?
Med Econ. 1996 Feb 26;73(4):138-9, 144-6, 148-50.
9
Denials of staff privileges face increased antitrust scrutiny.对员工特权的拒绝面临越来越多的反垄断审查。
Health Care Manage Rev. 1992 Fall;17(4):7-15.
10
Extending due process protections in managed care credentialling to hospital privileges.将管理式医疗资格认证中的正当程序保护扩展至医院特权。
J Health Law. 2001 Winter;34(1):47-66.

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