Frank R G, Salkever D S
Johns Hopkins University.
Rand J Econ. 1991 Autumn;22(3):430-45.
This article studies provision of charity care by private, nonprofit hospitals. We demonstrate that in the absence of large positive income effects on charity care supply, convex preferences for the nonprofit hospital imply crowding out by other private or government hospitals. Extending our model to include impure altruism (rivalry) provides a possible explanation for the previously reported empirical result that both crowding out and income effects on indigent care supply are often weak or insignificant. Empirical analysis of data for hospitals in Maryland provides evidence of rivalry on the supply of charity care.
本文研究私立非营利性医院提供慈善医疗服务的情况。我们证明，在对慈善医疗服务供给没有巨大正向收入效应的情况下，非营利性医院的凸性偏好意味着会被其他私立或政府医院挤出。将我们的模型扩展到包含不纯利他主义（竞争），为先前报道的实证结果提供了一种可能的解释，即挤出效应和对贫困医疗服务供给的收入效应往往都很微弱或不显著。对马里兰州医院数据的实证分析为慈善医疗服务供给中的竞争提供了证据。
