Newhouse J P, Sloss E M, Manning W G, Keeler E B
Harvard University.
Health Care Financ Rev. 1993 Fall;15(1):39-54.
Few capitation arrangements vary premiums by a child's health characteristics, yielding an incentive to discriminate against children with predictably high expenditures from chronic diseases. In this article, we explore risk adjusters for the 35 percent of the variance in annual out-patient expenditure we find to be potentially predictable. Demographic factors such as age and gender only explain 5 percent of such variance; health status measures explain 25 percent, prior use and health status measures together explain 65 to 70 percent. The profit from risk selection falls less than proportionately with improved ability to adjust for risk. Partial capitation rates may be necessary to mitigate skimming and dumping.
很少有按人头付费的安排会根据孩子的健康特征来调整保费,这就产生了一种歧视慢性病患儿的动机,因为这些患儿的支出预计会很高。在本文中,我们探讨了风险调整因素,用于应对我们发现的占年度门诊支出方差35%的潜在可预测部分。年龄和性别等人口统计学因素仅解释了此类方差的5%;健康状况指标解释了25%,既往使用情况和健康状况指标共同解释了65%至70%。风险选择带来的利润下降幅度小于风险调整能力提高的比例。可能需要采用部分按人头付费率来减轻撇脂和倾销行为。