Benjamini Y, Gafni A
Socioecon Plann Sci. 1986;20(2):69-74. doi: 10.1016/0038-0121(86)90029-7.
Medical technology diffusion and its effect on the modern hospital and on the rising costs of medical care is an issue which receives considerable attention from economists and policy analysts. In this paper a different approach is used to understand this phenomenon. We present the decision of a single hospital, whether or not to adopt an advanced technology system, using the concept of a noncooperative, nonzero sum game. Such presentation provides us with more insight on the conflict in which hospitals find themselves; the "catch" which pushes them to purchase more and more sophisticated and expensive technology in the hope that they will be able to successfully compete with other hospitals. The situation is further complicated by the existence of another "hidden" player--society, whose goals may differ from those of any individual hospital and even from the collective interests of the hospital sector. Possible conflicts that may exist and suggested solutions for each participant are presented and their policy implication are discussed.
医疗技术的传播及其对现代医院和医疗成本上升的影响是一个受到经济学家和政策分析师相当关注的问题。在本文中，我们采用了一种不同的方法来理解这一现象。我们运用非合作、非零和博弈的概念，展示了一家医院关于是否采用先进技术系统的决策。这样的展示让我们对医院所处的冲突有了更多的洞察；这种“困境”促使它们购买越来越复杂和昂贵的技术，以期能够成功地与其他医院竞争。另一个“隐藏”参与者——社会的存在，使情况变得更加复杂，社会的目标可能不同于任何一家医院的目标，甚至不同于医院行业的集体利益。本文呈现了可能存在的冲突以及针对每个参与者的建议解决方案，并讨论了它们的政策含义。
