Schwartz D L
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203, USA.
Cogn Psychol. 1999 May;38(3):433-64. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1998.0702.
Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.
当人们想象一个物体对另一个物体造成变化时，就会产生物理意象。为了通过物理意象进行推理，人们必须表征协调想象物体间相互作用的信息。当前的研究对比了关于这种协调信息在物理意象中如何实现的两种观点。在传统的运动学表述中，意象转换由模拟空间表征中的几何信息协调。在动态表述中，转换也可能由力和阻力的模拟表征调节。四个实验支持了动态表述。例如，实验表明，在不改变问题空间属性的情况下，动态感知信息（如扭矩）和关于物理属性的信念（如粘性）会影响人们通过意象得出的推理。这些研究表明，物理意象与其说是视觉感知的模拟，不如说是身体动作的模拟。一个将力表示为速率的简单模型有助于解释为什么即使人们可能没有明确的答案，推理也能通过想象的动作产生。它还解释了感知、信念和学习如何以及何时会影响物理意象。
