Boles TL, Croson RT, Murnighan JK
Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa
Organ Behav Hum Decis Process. 2000 Nov;83(2):235-259. doi: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2908.
This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
本文研究了重复最后通牒式讨价还价中欺骗与报复的动态变化。匿名的二人组在一系列四个最后通牒式讨价还价博弈中交换信息和提议，这些博弈有获得相对大额金钱收益的前景。各方对另一方资源和选择的了解程度不同，创造了欺骗的机会。先前未知信息的披露揭露了欺骗行为，并在后续互动中创造了报复的机会。结果表明，尽管提议者和回应者选择欺骗策略的频率几乎相同，但提议者撒的直接谎言更多。当他们的私人信息从未被披露时，双方都更具欺骗性，而当提议者的潜在利润最大时，他们最具欺骗性。提议者谎言的揭露对他们随后的行为影响甚微，尽管回应者比来自诚实提议者或先前欺骗行为从未被揭露的提议者的类似提议更多地拒绝了他们的提议。讨论和结论涉及重复讨价还价互动中欺骗与报复的动态变化。版权所有2000年学术出版社。
