Brenner L
Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, USA.
Psychol Rev. 2000 Oct;107(4):943-6. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.107.4.943.
I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten, and D. V. Budescu (1994) showed that the same probability judgment data can reveal both apparent overconfidence and underconfidence, depending on how the data are analyzed. To explain this seeming paradox, I. Erev et al. proposed a general model of judgment in which overt responses are related to underlying "true judgments" that are perturbed by error. A central conclusion of their work is that observed over- and underconfidence can be split into two components: (a) "true" over- and underconfidence and (b) "artifactual" over- and underconfidence due to error in judgment. It is argued in the present article that decomposing over- and underconfidence into true and artifactual components is inappropriate. The mistake stems from giving primacy to ambiguously defined model constructions (true judgments) over observed data.
I. 埃雷夫、T. S. 沃尔斯滕和D. V. 布德斯科（1994年）表明，相同的概率判断数据根据分析方式的不同，既能显示出明显的过度自信，也能显示出信心不足。为了解释这一看似矛盾的现象，I. 埃雷夫等人提出了一个通用的判断模型，在该模型中，公开的反应与受到误差干扰的潜在“真实判断”相关。他们工作的一个核心结论是，观察到的过度自信和信心不足可以分为两个部分：（a）“真实的”过度自信和信心不足，以及（b）由于判断误差导致的“人为的”过度自信和信心不足。本文认为，将过度自信和信心不足分解为真实部分和人为部分是不合适的。错误源于将定义模糊的模型结构（真实判断）置于观察数据之上。
