Godfray H C, Johnstone R A
NERC Centre for Population Biology, Department of Biology, Imperial College at Silwood Park, Ascot, Berkshire, UK.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2000 Nov 29;355(1403):1581-91. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2000.0719.
The evolution of biological signalling in the face of evolutionary conflicts of interest is an active area of evolutionary ecology, and one to which Maynard Smith has made important contributions. We explore the major theoretical challenges in the field, concentrating largely on how offspring signal to their parents when there is the potential for parent-offspring conflict. Costly offspring solicitation (begging etc.) has been interpreted in terms of a Zahavi Grafen honest handicap signal, but this has been challenged on the grounds of' the costs of signalling. We review this controversy and also explore the issue of pooling versus separating signalling equilibrium. An alternative explanation for costly begging is that it is due to sibling competition, and we discuss the relationship between these ideas and signalling models in families with more than one offspring. Finally we consider signal uncertainty, how signalling models can be made dynamic, and briefly how they may be tested experimentally.
面对利益的进化冲突时生物信号的进化是进化生态学的一个活跃领域,梅纳德·史密斯对此做出了重要贡献。我们探讨了该领域的主要理论挑战,主要集中在当亲子之间存在冲突可能性时,后代如何向父母发出信号。代价高昂的后代 solicitation(如乞食等)已根据扎哈维-格拉芬诚实障碍信号进行解释,但这一解释因信号传递成本问题而受到挑战。我们回顾了这一争议,并探讨了混合信号与分离信号均衡的问题。对代价高昂的乞食行为的另一种解释是,它是由兄弟姐妹之间的竞争导致的,我们讨论了这些观点与有多个后代的家庭中的信号模型之间的关系。最后,我们考虑信号的不确定性、如何使信号模型动态化,以及简要介绍如何通过实验对其进行测试。 (注:原文中“solicitation”这个词在这里结合语境推测大概是类似“求取、索要”之类的意思,但不太确定准确中文,所以保留英文未翻译,你可根据实际情况调整。)