Beyleveld D, Brownsword R
Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield, Sheffield Institute of Biotechnological Law and Ethics, UK.
Health Care Anal. 2000;8(2):87-99. doi: 10.1023/A:1009450511992.
This paper challenges the view, commonly held in biolaw and bioethics, that there can be no proprietary rights in our own bodies or body parts. Whether the starting point is the post-intervention informed consent regime of Article 22 of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine or the traditional (exclusionary) understanding of private property it is argued that property in our own bodies or body parts is presupposed. Although these arguments do not demonstrate that there is property of this kind (for that, a full-scale justification of the institution of private property would be required), they suggest nevertheless that the commonly held view has an immanent property logic that has not yet been drawn out or appreciated.
本文对生物法和生物伦理领域中普遍持有的一种观点提出了挑战,即我们对自身身体或身体部位不享有所有权。无论出发点是《人权与生物医学公约》第22条规定的干预后知情同意制度,还是对私有财产的传统(排他性)理解,都有人认为,我们对自身身体或身体部位的所有权是预先假定的。尽管这些论点并未证明存在此类所有权(要证明这一点,需要对私有财产制度进行全面论证),但它们仍表明,这种普遍持有的观点具有一种尚未被揭示或认识到的内在财产逻辑。