Felthous A R, Kachigian C
Department of Psychiatry, Southern Illinois University School of Medicine, USA.
Behav Sci Law. 2001;19(3):355-73. doi: 10.1002/bsl.451.
Prior to the Tarasoff decisions, jurisprudence pertaining to the duty to warn, or inform, to prevent violence to third persons, was separate from that pertaining to the duty to control to prevent such violence. The Tarasoff Principle consolidated preventive obligations in the face of foreseeable violence under a single "duty to protect." Even as courts adopted divergent rules for establishing foreseeability, many held to a single duty to protect with warnings as one possibility for fulfilling this option. Particularly over the past decade, courts have again disengaged the duty to warn and the duty to control, each requiring different legal predicates to occur. In recent years, courts have upheld or rejected a duty to warn, upheld or rejected a duty to control; and several courts have, within a single opinion, articulated fundamental distinctions between these two separate protective duties.
在塔拉索夫案的判决之前，关于警告或告知以防止对第三人的暴力行为的法理学，与关于控制以防止此类暴力行为的法理学是分开的。塔拉索夫原则在单一的“保护义务”下整合了面对可预见暴力行为的预防义务。即使法院采用了不同的规则来确定可预见性，但许多法院坚持单一的保护义务，将警告作为履行这一义务的一种可能性。特别是在过去十年中，法院再次将警告义务和控制义务区分开来，每项义务都需要不同的法律前提条件才能成立。近年来，法院维持或驳回了警告义务，维持或驳回了控制义务；并且一些法院在单一的意见中，阐明了这两项单独的保护义务之间的根本区别。
