Macphail E M, Bolhuis J J
Department of Psychology, University of York, Heslington, UK.
Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc. 2001 Aug;76(3):341-64. doi: 10.1017/s146479310100570x.
Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
达尔文认为，物种之间的智力差异是程度上的差异，而非种类上的差异。当代动物认知的生态学方法认为，动物已经进化出特定物种和特定问题的解决过程，以解决与其特定生态位相关的问题：因此，不同物种使用不同的过程，并且在同一物种内，不同的过程用于解决涉及不同输入的问题。这种方法既与达尔文的观点形成对比，也与一般过程观点形成对比，一般过程观点认为，在涉及非常不同输入的广泛问题中，使用相同的学习和记忆核心过程。我们回顾了与非人类动物的学习和记忆表现会根据所涉及刺激的性质而变化这一说法相关的证据。我们首先讨论资源分配假说、嗅觉学习集的形成以及“生物限制”文献，但在这些主题中没有找到令人信服的证据来支持认知的生态学解释。然后我们讨论了这样一种说法，即与那些对储存食物依赖较少或不储存食物的物种相比，在严重依赖储存食物的物种中，鸟类在空间学习和记忆任务中的表现更出色。如果能够证明储存食物的物种在空间（而非非空间）任务中确实具有优势，那么这将表明空间任务确实是通过与非空间任务不同的过程来解决的。我们对这一文献的回顾并未发现储存食物的鸟类在空间任务中始终优于不储存食物的鸟类，特别是当任务要求增加时，例如增加要回忆的项目数量或延长保留期，没有证据表明储存食物的物种具有更强的优势。我们还讨论了这样一个观察结果，即储存食物的鸟类的海马体比不储存食物的鸟类的海马体更大，并发现了与海马体增大与增强的空间记忆相关这一观点相反的证据；然而，我们无法提出一个令人信服的替代解释来解释海马体增大的现象。未能找到对生态学观点的有力支持，这支持了这样一种观点，即在学习和记忆过程中，动物物种之间在认知方面没有质的差异。我们还认为，我们的回顾支持了我们的观点，即对行为过程的系统发育发展和功能的推测并不能为深入了解这些过程的本质提供坚实的基础。最后，我们承认相信动物认知中存在一个主要的质的差异：我们相信只有人类能够习得语言，正是这种能力使我们的智力与非人类智力产生了如此巨大的差异。
