Irwin Louis N
University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, United States.
Front Syst Neurosci. 2020 Aug 13;14:57. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2020.00057. eCollection 2020.
The vast majority of neurobiologists have long abandoned the Cartesian view of non-human animals as unconscious automatons-acknowledging instead the high likelihood that mammals and birds have mental experiences akin to subjective consciousness. Several lines of evidence are now extending those limits to all vertebrates and even some invertebrates, though graded in degrees as argued originally by Darwin, correlated with the complexity of the animal's brain. A principal argument for this view is that the function of consciousness is to promote the survival of an animal-especially one actively moving about-in the face of dynamic changes and real-time contingencies. Cognitive ecologists point to the unique features of each animal's environment and the specific behavioral capabilities that different environments invoke, thereby suggesting that consciousness must take on a great variety of forms, many of which differ substantially from human subjective experience.
绝大多数神经生物学家早就摒弃了笛卡尔将非人类动物视为无意识自动机器的观点,转而承认哺乳动物和鸟类极有可能拥有类似于主观意识的心理体验。现在,有几条证据链正在将这些界限扩展到所有脊椎动物,甚至一些无脊椎动物,不过正如达尔文最初所主张的那样,这些体验是有程度之分的,与动物大脑的复杂程度相关。支持这一观点的一个主要论据是,意识的功能是促进动物的生存,尤其是在面对动态变化和实时突发情况时积极活动的动物。认知生态学家指出了每种动物环境的独特特征以及不同环境所引发的特定行为能力,从而表明意识必定呈现出多种多样的形式,其中许多形式与人类的主观体验有很大差异。