Fuchs T
Psychiatrische Klinik, Universität Heidelberg.
Nervenarzt. 2002 Mar;73(3):239-46. doi: 10.1007/s001150101110.
At first sight, the concept of "person" appears in psychiatric terminology only in the negative sense, i.e., as in depersonalization. However, self-alienation may be regarded as the hallmark of mental illness in general and is based on the ambiguous structure of human personality itself. Thorough analysis of the concept of the person is therefore indispensable to understanding psychopathology. This paper focuses on the contrast of "persona" ("mask" or "role") on the one hand to "person" as an individual self on the other. Their dialectical relation derives from basic anthropological structures such as sociality, self-reference, self-transcendence, and fictionality. As can be shown, the historical and cultural ontogeny of the personality includes experiences of self-alienation which may become relevant for psychiatry as depersonalization syndromes. The example of depression is used to illustrate vital and emotional depersonalization, whereas schizophrenia may be described as "intentional depersonalization." Following this line of reasoning, the classic schizophrenic experiences of alien control or thought insertion are interpreted as a disturbance in the fundamental personality structures.
乍一看，“人”的概念在精神病学术语中仅以否定的形式出现，即如人格解体中那样。然而，自我异化总体上可被视为精神疾病的标志，且它基于人类人格本身的模糊结构。因此，对“人”的概念进行透彻分析对于理解精神病理学而言必不可少。本文一方面着重探讨“人格面具”（“面具”或“角色”）与作为个体自我的“人”之间的对比。它们的辩证关系源自诸如社会性、自我指涉、自我超越和虚构性等基本人类学结构。如下所示，人格的历史文化个体发育包含自我异化的经历，这些经历作为人格解体综合征可能与精神病学相关。以抑郁症为例来说明重要的和情感性人格解体，而精神分裂症可被描述为“意向性人格解体”。按照这一推理思路，经典的精神分裂症患者的被控制感或思维插入体验被解释为基本人格结构的紊乱。
