• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

“麻烦因素”:是什么促使医生操纵报销规则?

The "Hassle Factor": what motivates physicians to manipulate reimbursement rules?

作者信息

Werner Rachel M, Alexander G Caleb, Fagerlin Angela, Ubel Peter A

机构信息

Department of Internal Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.

出版信息

Arch Intern Med. 2002 May 27;162(10):1134-9. doi: 10.1001/archinte.162.10.1134.

DOI:10.1001/archinte.162.10.1134
PMID:12020183
Abstract

BACKGROUND

Some physicians are willing to misrepresent clinical information to insurance companies to circumvent appeals processes. Whether characteristics of appeals processes affect the likelihood of misrepresentation is unknown. This study sought to determine the relationship between the likelihood of a successful appeal, appeals process length, and severity of the health condition and physicians' willingness to sanction deception.

METHODS

A random sample of 1617 physicians was surveyed by mail to assess their willingness to accept an insurance company restriction, to appeal the restriction, or to misrepresent the facts to an insurance company to obtain coverage for a patient.

RESULTS

Most respondents would appeal (77%) rather than accept (12%) or misrepresent (11%) regarding a restriction on medically necessary care. Physicians' decisions were related to the likelihood of a successful appeal (chi(2) = 7.56; P =.02), the appeals process length (chi(2) = 8.53; P =.01), and the severity of the medical condition (chi(2) = 71.10; P<.001). A small but significantly larger number of physicians chose to misrepresent the facts to an insurer as the appeals process became more cumbersome. Among physicians asked about severe angina, their decisions were particularly affected by the hassle associated with appealing, being more likely to choose to misrepresent the facts to the insurer than to appeal as the hassle increased.

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians are more willing to sanction deception when the appeals process is longer, the likelihood of a successful appeal is lower, and the health condition is more severe. Changes in the difficulty of appeals processes may ease the tensions physicians face regarding patient advocacy and honesty.

摘要

背景

一些医生愿意向保险公司歪曲临床信息以规避上诉程序。上诉程序的特征是否会影响歪曲行为的可能性尚不清楚。本研究旨在确定成功上诉的可能性、上诉程序的时长、健康状况的严重程度与医生认可欺骗行为的意愿之间的关系。

方法

通过邮件对1617名医生进行随机抽样调查,以评估他们对于接受保险公司限制、对该限制提出上诉或向保险公司歪曲事实以为患者获得保险赔付的意愿。

结果

对于医疗必需护理的限制,大多数受访者会选择上诉(77%),而非接受(12%)或歪曲事实(11%)。医生的决定与成功上诉的可能性(χ² = 7.56;P = 0.02)、上诉程序的时长(χ² = 8.53;P = 0.01)以及健康状况的严重程度(χ² = 71.10;P < 0.001)有关。随着上诉程序变得更加繁琐,选择向保险公司歪曲事实的医生数量虽少但显著增加。在被问及严重心绞痛的医生中,他们的决定尤其受到上诉带来的麻烦的影响,随着麻烦增加,他们更有可能选择向保险公司歪曲事实而非上诉。

结论

当上 诉程序更长、成功上诉的可能性更低且健康状况更严重时,医生更愿意认可欺骗行为。上诉程序难度的变化可能会缓解医生在患者维权和诚实方面所面临的紧张关系。

相似文献

1
The "Hassle Factor": what motivates physicians to manipulate reimbursement rules?“麻烦因素”:是什么促使医生操纵报销规则?
Arch Intern Med. 2002 May 27;162(10):1134-9. doi: 10.1001/archinte.162.10.1134.
2
Support for physician deception of insurance companies among a sample of Philadelphia residents.费城居民样本中对医生欺骗保险公司行为的支持情况。
Ann Intern Med. 2003 Mar 18;138(6):472-5. doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-138-6-200303180-00011.
3
Impact of managed care on physicians' decisions to manipulate reimbursement rules: an explanatory model.管理式医疗对医生操纵报销规则决策的影响:一个解释模型。
J Health Serv Res Policy. 2007 Jul;12(3):147-52. doi: 10.1258/135581907781543102.
4
Physicians' interactions with third-party payers: is deception necessary?
Arch Intern Med. 2004 Sep 27;164(17):1841-4. doi: 10.1001/archinte.164.17.1841.
5
Lying to insurance companies: the desire to deceive among physicians and the public.向保险公司说谎:医生和公众中的欺骗欲。
Am J Bioeth. 2004 Fall;4(4):53-9. doi: 10.1080/15265160490518566.
6
Lying for patients: physician deception of third-party payers.为患者说谎:医生对第三方付款人的欺骗行为
Arch Intern Med. 1999 Oct 25;159(19):2263-70. doi: 10.1001/archinte.159.19.2263.
7
Measuring deception: test-retest reliability of physicians' self-reported manipulation of reimbursement rules for patients.
Med Care Res Rev. 2002 Jun;59(2):184-96. doi: 10.1177/1077558702059002004.
8
Physician manipulation of reimbursement rules for patients: between a rock and a hard place.医生对患者报销规则的操控:进退两难。
JAMA. 2000 Apr 12;283(14):1858-65. doi: 10.1001/jama.283.14.1858.
9
Physicians' attitudes toward using deception to resolve difficult ethical problems.医生对于使用欺骗手段解决棘手伦理问题的态度。
JAMA. 1989 May 26;261(20):2980-5.
10
Insurance coverage, physician recommendations, and access to emerging treatments: growth hormone therapy for childhood short stature.保险覆盖范围、医生建议以及获得新兴治疗方法的情况:儿童矮小症的生长激素治疗
JAMA. 1998 Mar 4;279(9):663-8. doi: 10.1001/jama.279.9.663.

引用本文的文献

1
Variability in Primary Care Physician Attitudes Toward Medicaid Work Requirement Exemption Requests Made by Patients With Depression.初级保健医生对抑郁症患者提出的医疗补助工作要求豁免请求的态度存在差异。
JAMA Health Forum. 2021 Oct 1;2(10):e212932. doi: 10.1001/jamahealthforum.2021.2932. eCollection 2021 Oct.
2
How Financial and Reputational Incentives Can Be Used to Improve Medical Care.如何利用经济和声誉激励措施改善医疗服务。
Health Serv Res. 2015 Dec;50 Suppl 2(Suppl 2):2090-115. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.12419. Epub 2015 Nov 17.
3
No evidence of the effect of the interventions to combat health care fraud and abuse: a systematic review of literature.
无对抗医疗保健欺诈和滥用的干预措施效果的证据:文献系统评价。
PLoS One. 2012;7(8):e41988. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0041988. Epub 2012 Aug 24.
4
Is There a Tension between Clinical Practice and Reimbursement Policy? The Case of Osteoarthritis Prescribing Practices in Ontario.临床实践与报销政策之间是否存在矛盾?安大略省骨关节炎处方实践的案例。
Healthc Policy. 2007 Nov;3(2):e128-44.
5
U.S. military mental health care utilization and attrition prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争之前美国军队的心理健康护理利用情况与人员损耗情况。
Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol. 2009 Jun;44(6):473-81. doi: 10.1007/s00127-008-0461-7. Epub 2008 Dec 4.