Roland Martin, Dudley R Adams
Department of Public Health and Primary Care, Institute of Public Health, University of Cambridge, Robinson Way, Cambridge CB2 0SR, UK.
Center for Healthcare Value, Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA.
Health Serv Res. 2015 Dec;50 Suppl 2(Suppl 2):2090-115. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.12419. Epub 2015 Nov 17.
Narrative review of the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) and public reporting (PR) on health care outcomes, including spillover effects and impact on disparities.
The impact of P4P and PR is dependent on the underlying payment system (fee-for-service, salary, capitation) into which these schemes are introduced. Both have the potential to improve care, but they can also have substantial unintended consequences. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that individual physicians will vary in how they respond to incentives. We also discuss issues to be considered when including patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) or patient-reported experience measures into P4P and PR schemes.
We provide guidance to payers and policy makers on the design of P4P and PR programs so as to maximize their benefits and minimize their unintended consequences. These include involving clinicians in the design of the program, taking into account the payment system into which new incentives are introduced, designing the structure of reward programs to maximize the likelihood of intended outcomes and minimize the likelihood of unintended consequences, designing schemes that minimize the risk of increasing disparities, providing stability of incentives over some years, and including outcomes that are relevant to patients' priorities. In addition, because of the limitations of PR and P4P as effective interventions in their own right, it is important that they are combined with other policies and interventions intended to improve quality to maximize their likely impact.
对绩效薪酬(P4P)和公开报告(PR)对医疗保健结果的影响进行叙述性综述,包括溢出效应和对差异的影响。
P4P和PR的影响取决于引入这些方案的基础支付系统(按服务收费、薪资、人头费)。两者都有可能改善医疗服务,但也可能产生重大的意外后果。行为经济学文献的证据表明,个体医生对激励措施的反应会有所不同。我们还讨论了在将患者报告的结果测量(PROMs)或患者报告的体验测量纳入P4P和PR方案时需要考虑的问题。
我们为支付方和政策制定者提供有关P4P和PR项目设计的指导,以使其效益最大化并将意外后果最小化。这些指导包括让临床医生参与项目设计,考虑引入新激励措施的支付系统,设计奖励项目的结构以最大化预期结果的可能性并最小化意外后果的可能性,设计能将差异扩大风险降至最低的方案,在若干年内提供稳定的激励措施,并纳入与患者优先事项相关的结果。此外,由于PR和P4P本身作为有效干预措施存在局限性,将它们与其他旨在提高质量的政策和干预措施相结合以最大化其可能产生的影响非常重要。