Bishop Mark
Cybernetics Intelligence Research Group, Department of Cybernetics, University of Reading, Berkshire, UK.
Conscious Cogn. 2002 Dec;11(4):642-52. doi: 10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00023-5.
The initial argument presented herein is not significantly original--it is a simple reflection upon a notion of computation originally developed by Putnam (Putnam 1988; see also Searle, 1990) and criticised by Chalmers et al. (Chalmers, 1994; 1996a, b; see also the special issue, What is Computation?, in Minds and Machines, 4:4, November 1994). In what follows, instead of seeking to justify Putnam's conclusion that every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA) and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of FSA Q, as it executes program (P) on input (I). If correct the resulting bold philosophical claim is that phenomenal states--such as feelings and visual experiences--can never be understood or explained functionally.
本文最初提出的论点并非极具原创性——它只是对一种最初由普特南提出（普特南，1988年；另见塞尔，1990年）并受到查尔默斯等人批评的计算概念的简单反思（查尔默斯，1994年；1996年a、b；另见《心灵与机器》1994年11月第4卷第4期《什么是计算？》特刊）。在接下来的内容中，我不会试图去证明普特南的结论，即每个开放系统都实现了每个有限状态自动机（FSA），因此大脑的心理状态不可能是计算机的功能状态，而是要确立一个较弱的结果，即在有限的时间窗口内，每个开放系统在输入（I）上执行程序（P）时都会实现有限状态自动机Q的踪迹。如果这是正确的，那么由此得出的大胆的哲学主张就是，诸如感觉和视觉体验等现象状态永远无法从功能上得到理解或解释。
