Anderson David, Copeland B Jack
Division of Computer Science University of Portsmouth, Mercantile House, Hampshire, PO1 2EG, UK.
Artif Life. 2002;8(4):371-8. doi: 10.1162/106454602321202435.
"Strong artificial life" refers to the thesis that a sufficiently sophisticated computer simulation of a life form is a life form in its own right. Can John Searle's Chinese room argument [12]-originally intended by him to show that the thesis he dubs "strong AI" is false-be deployed against strong ALife? We have often encountered the suggestion that it can be (even in print; see Harnad [8]). We do our best to transfer the argument from the domain of AI to that of ALife. We do so in order to show once and for all that the Chinese room argument proves nothing about ALife. There may indeed be powerful philosophical objections to the thesis of strong ALife, but the Chinese room argument is not among them.
“强人工生命”指的是这样一种论点，即对生命形式进行足够复杂的计算机模拟本身就是一种生命形式。约翰·塞尔的中文房间论证[12]——最初他提出该论证是为了表明他所称为“强人工智能”的论点是错误的——能否用于反驳强人工生命论呢？我们经常遇到这样的观点，认为它可以（甚至在出版物中也能看到；见哈纳德[8]）。我们尽力将该论证从人工智能领域转换到人工生命领域。我们这样做是为了一劳永逸地表明，中文房间论证与人工生命毫无关系。对于强人工生命论，可能确实存在有力的哲学反对意见，但中文房间论证并不在其中。
