Stins John F
Research Institute MOVE, Faculty of Human Movement Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Conscious Cogn. 2009 Mar;18(1):187-92. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.12.005. Epub 2008 Feb 8.
In a recent study of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, [Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006). Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, 313, 1402] claimed that they had demonstrated the presence of consciousness in this patient. This bold conclusion was based on the isomorphy between brain activity in this patient and a set of conscious control subjects, obtained in various imagery tasks. However, establishing consciousness in unresponsive patients is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the current debate surrounding consciousness in VS patients has parallels in the artificial intelligence (AI) debate as to whether machines can think. Basically, (Owen et al., 2006) used a method analogous to the Turing test to reveal the presence of consciousness, whereas their adversaries adopted a line of reasoning akin to Searle's Chinese room argument. Highlighting the correspondence between these two debates can help to clarify the issues surrounding consciousness in non-communicative agents.
在最近一项针对一名处于持续性植物状态患者的研究中,[欧文,A.M.,科尔曼,M.R.,博利,M.,戴维斯,M.H.,劳雷斯,S.,&皮卡德,J.D.(2006年)。检测植物状态下的意识。《科学》,313,1402]声称他们已经证明该患者存在意识。这一大胆结论是基于该患者的大脑活动与一组有意识的对照受试者在各种成像任务中获得的大脑活动同构。然而,在无反应患者中确立意识充满了方法学和概念上的困难。本文的目的是表明,当前围绕植物状态患者意识的争论在人工智能(AI)关于机器是否能思考的争论中有相似之处。基本上,(欧文等人,2006年)使用了一种类似于图灵测试的方法来揭示意识的存在,而他们的对手则采用了类似于塞尔的中文房间论证的推理思路。强调这两场争论之间的对应关系有助于澄清围绕无交流能力主体意识的问题。