Tsakiris Manos, Haggard Patrick
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK.
Exp Brain Res. 2003 Apr;149(4):439-46. doi: 10.1007/s00221-003-1386-8. Epub 2003 Feb 19.
How does the brain distinguish actions that we perform from movements imposed on us? To study links between the representations of actions and their somatosensory consequences, we compared the perceived times of voluntary actions or involuntary movements and of a subsequent somatic effect (a TMS-induced twitch of the right index finger). Participants perceived voluntary actions as occurring later and their bodily effects as occurring earlier in the agency context, compared to single-event baseline conditions. When the voluntary action was replaced by a passive, involuntary movement this attraction effect reversed. In a second experiment, subjects rated the intensity of the same TMS-induced somatic effect, again following a voluntary action or a passive movement. When the somatic effect was caused by a voluntary action, it was perceived as significantly less intense than when it followed a passive movement. Our results suggest a binding mechanism integrating awareness of somatic consequences occurring in voluntary action. This 'intentional binding' mechanism might underlie the way in which the mind constructs a strong association between intentions, actions and consequences so as to generate the unique and private phenomenological experience of self-agency.
大脑如何区分我们主动执行的动作和强加于我们的动作?为了研究动作表征与其体感后果之间的联系,我们比较了自愿动作或非自愿运动以及随后的躯体效应(经颅磁刺激诱发的右手食指抽搐)的感知时间。与单事件基线条件相比,参与者在 agency 情境中感知到自愿动作发生得更晚,而其身体效应发生得更早。当自愿动作被被动的、非自愿的运动取代时,这种吸引效应就会逆转。在第二个实验中,受试者同样在自愿动作或被动运动之后,对相同的经颅磁刺激诱发的躯体效应的强度进行评分。当躯体效应由自愿动作引起时,与由被动运动引起相比,其被感知的强度明显更低。我们的研究结果表明,存在一种整合自愿动作中发生的躯体后果意识的绑定机制。这种“意向绑定”机制可能是心智在意图、动作和后果之间构建强烈关联,从而产生自我能动性独特而私密的现象学体验的方式的基础。