Ashford David A, Kaiser Robyn M, Bales Michael E, Shutt Kathleen, Patrawalla Amee, McShan Andre, Tappero Jordan W, Perkins Bradley A, Dannenberg Andrew L
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, Mailstop C09, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2003 May;9(5):515-9. doi: 10.3201/eid0905.020388.
We examined outbreak investigations conducted around the world from 1988 to 1999 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Epidemic Intelligence Service. In 44 (4.0%) of 1,099 investigations, identified causative agents had bioterrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional use of infectious agents was considered. Healthcare providers reported 270 (24.6%) outbreaks and infection control practitioners reported 129 (11.7%); together they reported 399 (36.3%) of the outbreaks. Health departments reported 335 (30.5%) outbreaks. For six outbreaks in which bioterrorism or intentional contamination was possible, reporting was delayed for up to 26 days. We confirmed that the most critical component for bioterrorism outbreak detection and reporting is the frontline healthcare profession and the local health departments. Bioterrorism preparedness should emphasize education and support of this frontline as well as methods to shorten the time between outbreak and reporting.
我们研究了1988年至1999年期间美国疾病控制与预防中心疫情情报服务部在全球开展的疫情调查。在1099项调查中,有44项(4.0%)确定的病原体具有生物恐怖主义潜力。在6项调查中,考虑了故意使用感染性因子的情况。医疗保健提供者报告了270起(24.6%)疫情,感染控制从业人员报告了129起(11.7%);他们总共报告了399起(36.3%)疫情。卫生部门报告了335起(30.5%)疫情。对于6起可能存在生物恐怖主义或故意污染的疫情,报告延迟了长达26天。我们证实,生物恐怖主义疫情检测和报告的最关键组成部分是一线医疗保健行业和地方卫生部门。生物恐怖主义防范应强调对这一一线人员的教育和支持,以及缩短疫情发生与报告之间时间的方法。