de Castro L D
Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 126 Bernard Street, Area 2, Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines.
J Med Ethics. 2003 Jun;29(3):142-6. doi: 10.1136/jme.29.3.142.
This paper takes the view that compensated donation and altruism are not incompatible. In particular, it holds that the arguments against giving compensation stand on weak rational grounds: (1) the charge that compensation fosters "commodification" has neither been specific enough to account for different types of monetary transactions nor sufficiently grounded in reality to be rationally convincing; (2) although altruism is commendable, organ donors should not be compelled to act purely on the basis of altruistic motivations, especially if there are good reasons to believe that significantly more lives can be saved and enhanced if incentives are put in place, and (3) offering compensation for organs does not necessarily lead to exploitation-on the contrary, it may be regarded as a necessity in efforts to minimise the level of exploitation that already exists in current organ procurement systems.
本文认为有偿捐赠与利他主义并非相互排斥。具体而言,它认为反对给予补偿的论据基于薄弱的理性依据:(1)关于补偿助长“商品化”的指控既不够具体,无法解释不同类型的货币交易,也缺乏足够的现实依据,难以令人信服;(2)尽管利他主义值得称赞,但不应强迫器官捐赠者纯粹基于利他动机行事,特别是如果有充分理由相信,提供激励措施能够挽救和改善更多生命;(3)为器官提供补偿不一定会导致剥削,相反,这可能被视为尽量减少当前器官获取系统中已存在的剥削程度的必要举措。