Zwierlein E
Forschungsstelle Technologie und Arbeit, Universität Kaiserslauten, Deutschland.
Wien Med Wochenschr. 1992;142(23-24):527-32.
The term "quality of life" might be used to qualify external circumstances with regard to the life of human beings (A). It also can be used to define the quality of a human life itself (B). Then it replaces the idea of "sanctity of life" by an eugenic idea that can be abused as a notion of discrimination. The B-position implies that life is only an instrument in order to serve a separable purpose (i.e. "the quality of being a person"). This specific quality articulates itself in so-called "indicators of humanhood/personhood". In consequence this "quality" is an eugenic expression including a dangerous power of definition and a selective anthropology that does not seem to be convincing theoretically and that can never serve as the basis of a reasonable and good social life of man.
“生活质量”这一术语可能用于限定人类生活的外部环境（A）。它也可用于界定人类生活本身的质量（B）。那么它就用一种优生学观念取代了“生命神圣”的观念，而这种观念可能被滥用作一种歧视观念。B观点意味着生命仅仅是实现一个可分离目的（即“作为人的品质”）的手段。这种特定品质在所谓的“人性/人格指标”中得以体现。因此，这种“质量”是一种优生学表达，包含一种危险的定义权以及一种选择性的人类学，这在理论上似乎并不令人信服，而且永远不能作为人类合理且美好的社会生活的基础。
