Johnson Branden B
Bureau of Risk Analysis, Division of Science, Research and Technology, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Trenton 08625-0409, USA.
Risk Anal. 2003 Oct;23(5):985-98. doi: 10.1111/1539-6924.00375.
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 required U.S. utilities to report on drinking water quality to their customers annually, beginning in fall 1999, on the assumption that such reports would alert them to quality problems and perhaps mobilize pressure for improvement. A random sample of New Jersey customers read alternative versions of a water quality report, in an experiment on reactions to water quality information under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) rules. Experiment design was 2 x 3 + 1: two versions each--one with, one without, a violation of a health standard--of a report that was (1) Qualitative (without water quality numbers, thus not meeting USEPA rules); (2) Basic, with minimal information meeting the rules; or (3) Extended, adding reading aids and utility performance information; plus a control instrument without any hypothetical report. Results of ANOVA suggest the reports will have less effect than hoped or feared. These manipulations were successful: people reading the Qualitative versions were less likely to say that the report gave the amounts of substances found in the water, and those reading Violation versions were more likely to report a violation of a health standard. The main differences in responses to the report involved the judged adequacy of the information, and to a lesser extent responses on a Concern scale (constructed from measures of concern, judged risk, clean-up intentions, distrust of utility information, and doubt that the utility was doing all it could to improve water quality). Overall judgments of water quality and utility performance did not change, either relative to the controls or in before versus after responses. Qualitative reports performed worse than others, confirming the decision to have utilities report actual contaminant levels. Extended reports did only slightly better than the Basic versions on these measures. Many respondents had trouble identifying the presence or absence of substance amounts or violations, despite their seeming obviousness (e.g., in a "bottom line" summary on the front page of each report), suggesting many were not processing this information carefully. However, the pattern of responses for those who accurately identified the presence or absence of substance amounts or violations did not differ substantially from that for the group as a whole. Generic risk beliefs (serious local environmental problems; lack of control over risks to one's health) dominated demographic variables, attitudes toward utility water quality or trustworthiness, and the content and format of water quality reports in influencing concern about drinking water quality. Previous empirical and theoretical evidence for lack of change in public risk attitudes due to one-time or infrequent communications--e.g., role of personal experience, perseverance of prior trust or distrust--seems to be confirmed for annual water quality reports.
1996年的《安全饮用水法修正案》要求美国的公用事业公司从1999年秋季开始,每年向客户报告饮用水质量,前提是这样的报告会使他们警惕质量问题,并可能促使他们施加压力以改善水质。在美国环境保护局(USEPA)的规定下,对新泽西州的客户进行了一项关于对水质信息反应的实验,随机抽取部分客户阅读水质报告的不同版本。实验设计为2×3 + 1:每个版本有两个——一个包含、一个不包含违反健康标准的情况——报告类型分别为:(1)定性报告(没有水质数据,因此不符合USEPA规定);(2)基本报告,包含符合规定的最少信息;(3)扩展报告,增加了阅读辅助和公用事业公司的绩效信息;再加上一个没有任何假设报告的对照工具。方差分析的结果表明,这些报告的效果将比预期的或担忧的要小。这些操作是成功的:阅读定性版本报告的人不太可能说报告给出了水中发现的物质含量,而阅读包含违规情况版本报告的人更有可能报告违反健康标准的情况。对报告反应的主要差异涉及对信息充分性的判断,以及在较小程度上涉及在关注量表上的反应(由关注程度、判断出的风险、清理意图、对公用事业公司信息的不信任以及怀疑公用事业公司是否尽其所能改善水质等指标构建)。相对于对照组或前后反应而言,对水质和公用事业公司绩效的总体判断没有变化。定性报告的表现比其他报告更差,这证实了让公用事业公司报告实际污染物水平的决定。在这些指标上,扩展报告仅比基本版本略好一点。许多受访者难以辨别是否存在物质含量或违规情况,尽管这些情况看似很明显(例如,在每份报告首页的“总结要点”中),这表明许多人没有仔细处理这些信息。然而,对于那些准确辨别出是否存在物质含量或违规情况的人的反应模式,与整个群体的反应模式没有太大差异。在影响对饮用水质量的关注方面,一般风险观念(严重的当地环境问题;对自身健康风险缺乏控制)比人口统计学变量、对公用事业公司水质的态度或可信度以及水质报告的内容和格式更为重要。以前关于一次性或不频繁的沟通不会改变公众风险态度的实证和理论证据——例如,个人经验的作用、先前信任或不信任的持续性——似乎在年度水质报告中得到了证实。