Brand-Ballard Jeffrey
Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA.
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2003 Sep;13(3):231-58. doi: 10.1353/ken.2003.0018.
Biomedical ethicists often assume that common morality constitutes a largely consistent normative system. This premise is not taken for granted in general normative ethics. This paper entertains the possibility of inconsistency within common morality and explores methodological implications. Assuming common morality to be inconsistent casts new light on the debate between principlists and descriptivists. One can view the two approaches as complementary attempts to evade or transcend that inconsistency. If common morality proves to be inconsistent, then principlists might have reason to prefer a less pluralist theory, thereby moving closer to descriptivism. Descriptivists, by contrast, might want to qualify their claim to accommodate all of people's basic moral convictions. Finally, both camps might wish to adopt a more revisionist posture, accepting that an adequate ethical theory occasionally will contradict some of people's deepest moral convictions. Proper application of the method of reflective equilibrium, to which both descriptivists and principlists claim allegiance, may entail greater openness to revisionism than either camp admits.
生物医学伦理学家常常假定，普遍道德构成了一个大体上一致的规范体系。在一般规范伦理学中，这一前提并非理所当然。本文探讨了普遍道德内部存在不一致性的可能性，并探究了其方法论意义。假定普遍道德是不一致的，这为原则主义者和描述主义者之间的争论带来了新的视角。人们可以将这两种方法视为规避或超越这种不一致性的互补尝试。如果普遍道德被证明是不一致的，那么原则主义者可能有理由倾向于一种不那么多元的理论，从而更接近描述主义。相比之下，描述主义者可能想要限定他们的主张，以容纳人们所有的基本道德信念。最后，两个阵营可能都希望采取一种更具修正主义的姿态，承认一种恰当的伦理理论偶尔会与人们一些最深层次的道德信念相矛盾。描述主义者和原则主义者都声称拥护的反思平衡方法的正确应用，可能需要比两个阵营所承认的更大程度地接受修正主义。
