Beauchamp Tom L
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2003 Sep;13(3):259-74. doi: 10.1353/ken.2003.0019.
Phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement have led writers in ethics to two antithetical conclusions: Either valid moral distinctions hold universally or they hold relative to a particular and contingent moral framework, and so cannot be applied with universal validly. Responding to three articles in this issue of the Journal that criticize his previously published views on the common morality, the author maintains that one can consistently deny universality to some justified moral norms and claim universality for others. Universality is located on the common morality and nonuniversality in other parts of the moral life, called "particular moralities." The existence of universal moral standards is defended in terms of: (1) a theory of the objectives of morality, (2) an account of the norms that achieve those objectives, and (3) an account of normative justification (both pragmatic and coherentist).
要么有效的道德区分具有普遍适用性，要么它们仅相对于特定且偶然的道德框架才成立，因而无法普遍有效地应用。针对本期《期刊》中三篇批评其先前发表的关于普遍道德观观点的文章，作者坚持认为，人们可以始终如一地否定某些合理道德规范的普遍性，同时主张其他道德规范具有普遍性。普遍性存在于普遍道德之中，而非普遍性则存在于道德生活的其他部分，即所谓的“特殊道德”。普遍道德标准的存在基于以下几点得以捍卫：（1）一种道德目标理论；（2）对实现这些目标的规范的阐释；（3）对规范正当性的阐释（包括实用主义和融贯论）。
